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Executive Summary
The savings paradox: that savers can (and do) take short term actions which harm their long term interests. This 
paper will  examine savers’ behaviour and particularly why they cash in their assets when faced with real or 
apparent risks, and consequently damage their net worth. Individuals cannot help themselves in overcoming this 
paradox, and therefore how governments can help will also be examined.
Savers’ savings are exposed to risks: risks to yields (the cash flow rewards for postponing consumption) and risks  
to values (the risks to the principal amounts saved). In this paper, what is meant by savings is the accumulation of  
incomes not spent, ie a person’s net worth. Individual savers rarely have a direct say in which risks their savings 
are exposed to; companies, banks, asset managers, pension fund managers and even governments take risks on 
their behalf. However, savers have one key weapon in their artillery which makes everyone listen: they can choose 
to move their savings away from risks which harm their net worth. They could do this, for example, by moving  
their money away from riskier investment products based on yields to products which are based on the lowest risk  
to value, such as some government bonds. Regretfully for savers, their short term actions in doing this do more  
harm than good. Assets like homes, company shares and government’s bonds - the main assets in which savings 
may have been converted - cannot be converted back quickly into cash. If savers try to do this, losses will be  
multiplied  rather  than  reduced.  As  individuals  cannot  solve  this  paradox,  the  solutions  could  be  found  in 
introducing collective risk management (CRM) methods.
Two elements about savings stand out. Firstly, savings (the net worth of households) have reached levels which 
are four or more times GDP; and secondly, savings are truly global. Individuals often hold their net worth with  
managers who are international in nature, such as banks, asset managers and pension funds. Therefore collective  
risk management methods should be more focussed on savings than on GDP, and also on getting governments to 
act more in cooperation with one another. Savers can be a force for good to economies, but equally a force to  
harm economic growth and employment levels.
Collective  risk  management  needs  a  CEO,  a  Minister  (or  Secretary)  for  Savings.  The  Minister  should  be 
independent from Government as governments themselves can be the cause of increased risks to savers. However,  
independence from Government does not imply independence from parliaments. The Minister’s actions should be  
based on assessments of the collective risks to savers, and can - and should - be sanctioned by parliaments. They  
can be preventive, but also curative measures.
Some examples.  Worldwide,  the  Ministers  of  Savings  would  have  noted  that  government  debt  is  a  type  of 
consumer  debt  which  depends  on  economic  growth,  employment  levels  and  incomes.  Therefore  parliaments 
should choose to set the long term government bond yield, balancing taxpayers’ interests against savers’ interests.  
In the U.S., when faced with the subprime mortgage crisis, the Secretary for Savings could have imposed a rule on 
the risk originators to guarantee the doubtful credit risks. 
For  the  Eurozone,  the  Ministers  of  Savings  would  agree  that  “cash  flights  to  safety”  by  savers  represent 
liquidation pricing, ie savers move their monies to protect the value of their net worth in a “fire sale”.  The seven  
countries  with  the  lowest  real  bond  interest  rates  could  raise  funds  from  the  markets;  not  for  government 
expenditure, but for financial risk management purposes. They could deposit these funds with the ECB which in  
turn could buy the bonds of the other 10 countries, thereby lowering their yields. All countries would benefit. In  
Spain, the Minister for Savings would have noted that the 800,000 unsold homes are the problem which has 
subsequently caused the banking problems. This paper suggests that one way of easing this housing issue would  
be to sell the homes to northern Europeans, offering them a subsidy for purchase, rather than bailing out the  
Spanish banks.
In other countries like the U.K., the U.S., the Netherlands and Canada, in order to manage the collective risks, the  
Ministers of Savings would have the option to stimulate economic growth by using the help of the pension funds 
and  life  insurance  companies.  Here,  the  Keynes  method  of  channelling  extra  borrowing  into  government 
expenditure is no longer an option. A “pension dividend” of about 2% of GDP could be handed out - tax free -  
directly to the pension savers and pensioners on an equal basis. Once growth rates are up and running, tax payers 
could gradually reimburse the pension funds etc for the loss of pension reserves. For countries in the Eurozone, 
without large pension savings, the same effect could be reached by using funds from the European Financial  
Stability Facility for countries like Spain and Italy.
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1. Savings
Long term savings are the bloodstream and oxygen to modern day economies. Just like in our bodies, such 
savings need to be nurtured, otherwise arteries get clogged up and heart attacks or other diseases may occur.
Households have accumulated savings over long periods of time.  To give a few examples:  in the U.S.,  
according to the Federal Reserve, the combined net worth of households, after deducting their borrowings,  
stood at US$ 62.9 trillion per the end of March 2012. This level of savings represented precisely four times  
U.S. GDP of US$ 15.5 trillion. For most U.S. households the prime source of wealth is their family home. In  
the U.K., a Lloyds Bank study estimates the U.K. household net worth at £6.6 trillion per the end of 2011. Of  
this amount £2.6 trillion is the net values of homes and £4 trillion the financial assets. With 2011 U.K. GDP 
at £1.55 trillion these savings represent four and a quarter times the 2011 U.K. GDP levels.
The banking sector in their mortgage businesses convert short term client deposits into long term funding for  
home  and  other  real  estate  acquisitions.  They  also  convert  short  term  client  deposits  into  funding  of 
government bonds. Banks are main contributors to asset conversion from cash into assets. Short term cash  
holdings become long term asset class commitments. 
Savings have become an international business. One has just to think of pension funds moving into asset  
classes overseas or Swiss banks helping their  client  base to seek long term investments for the clients’  
savings not in Switzerland, but around the world. Other examples are multinational companies which have 
their shares listed in several countries and cash flows coming in from many places in the world. In the  
Eurozone, the movement of savings between the 17 countries has been made easier as they share a common 
currency. Some countries, like Norway and some other oil-exporting countries as well as some far sighted 
governments, have set up sovereign wealth funds, which by their very nature invest their savings in countries 
other than their own.
For both short and long term savers the direct control over their savings is nearly always handed over to  
companies, banks, life insurance companies, pension funds, professional money management companies and 
also the government. All savers can do is hope that managements of all these institutions treat their savings  
prudently at reasonable costs. The final choice is one of withdrawing the savings.
Both the financial sector products and the people handling such products – the intermediaries- have grown in  
complexity over the last 30 years. All kind of risk instruments have been introduced, like currency, credit 
and commodity derivatives. Also spread betting on share developments, exchange traded funds, synthetic  
exchange traded funds and share lending practises have been introduced. Pension funds and life insurance  
companies  have  long  been  established  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  long  term  savers.  More  recently  asset  
management companies, hedge funds, vulture funds, and private equity funds have sprung up. Some of these 
activities  are  carried out  by the  banking  sector,  others  are  not.  Sometimes  banks,  through their  private 
banking activities help their clients to get involved in financial or real estate markets. 
How important are savings? Governments could not function without them, even if they are able to balance  
their tax revenues with their expenditure levels in the current year. For the European Union countries, their  
average government debt obligations -from past  expenditure- stood at  82.5% of GDP over 2011. House 
building would not happen if it were not for savings converted into mortgages to help people buy or rent.  
Companies could not grow in the same way as they have done if it were not for the stock markets helping  
them to provide equity.    
Since 2008 when bank risks became a major issue, governments have introduced government guarantees for 
bank deposits for limited amounts. As banks are major holders of government bonds, most taxpayers are 
guaranteeing themselves for these risks. Perhaps this was not the intended aim of such guarantees.
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Regretfully governments’ actions on collective risk management for long term savers can only be described 
as fragmented, uncoordinated and reacting to situations rather than pro-actively anticipating measures to  
ensure sound long term saving practices.
2. The Savings Paradox
The savings paradox can best be illustrated with a country example: the 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.
In the U.S. during the few years preceding 2008, mortgage originators started to have mortgages approved by 
banks on basis of  doubtful  principles.  A Deutsche Bank study came to the conclusion that  37% of the 
mortgages granted were interest only mortgages; 38% of the mortgages also required no down payment so 
100% of the value of the home was borrowed; 43% of the borrowers were not required to provide any proof 
of income and finally 80% of borrowers were attracted by providing them with a low start up interest rate for 
a period of two years, after which interest rates were hiked up steeply.
The subprime market segment “only” amounted to U.S$ 1.2 trillion out of the total home mortgage market of  
U.S$ 10 trillion.
U.S. investment banks started to package these subprime mortgages into Collateralised Debt Obligations.  
Based on AAA ratings from the U.S. credit rating agencies, the investment banks sold these CDO’s around 
the world, but also to U.S. money market funds. When the real risks to these mortgages appeared, as cash  
flows  faltered,  the  U.S  investment  banks  were  in  no  position  to  maintain  a  market  in  these  CDO’s.,  
something they had promised to do. The CDO’s turned from “going concern” to “liquidation” CDO’s. The 
pricing fell of the cliff and many CDO holders could not get out of the risks: The savings paradox.
The cash flow misjudgements led to value misjudgements.  Such liquidation scenario led to repossessions  
and forced sales of properties in the U.S. The S&P/ Case Shiller home price index dropped from an index  
value 170 at the end of 2007 till 130 a year later.  Banks, apart from lending to their own clients, also lend to  
each other, as well as trade in risk products. The banks among themselves, as well as the markets, became  
uncertain which bank had what type of exposure. Interbank lending dried up. It led to bank closures and bank 
rescues especially in the U.S., the U.K. and some European countries. Credit tightening took place around 
the world. This led to an overspill into the share markets. The shares dropped on real and perceived company  
and bank risks. They also spread to the U.S. and other governments, which had to borrow substantial funds 
to bail out banks and to compensate for lower tax incomes. The U.S. defined benefit schemes saw their asset  
values drop by 30% in 2008 and they alone lost around $1 trillion in the same year. As companies guarantee  
the  pension  benefits  in  DB schemes  this  led  to  another  unwanted  side effect,  in  2009 U.S.  companies  
maintaining DB schemes were forced to set aside U.S$ 90 billion compared to U.S$ 45 billion in 2008, a  
doubling of contributions in times of recession. The “oil spill” effects of the subprime mortgage debacle had 
serious effects on the long term savers, but also on the real economies throughout the world through lower or 
negative economic growth rates with higher unemployment rates, bank lending restrictions or contractions, a  
drop in company sales levels and increased government deficit levels. The original loss on cash flows from 
subprime mortgages was multiplied many times over in the financial markets and the real economies. 
Were markets right in assessing that home prices dropped by 24% in a year in the U.S in 2008 and that the  
Dow Jones industrial index dropped by just over 40% from October 2007 till October 2008? My conclusion  
is that market prices for real estate and shares were driven by savers, in panic, trying to get out of risks in the  
short run by forcing through real estate and share sales. Such panic share pricing did not reflect the net  
present values of the future profits of companies. In the real estate markets the net present values of future  
rental incomes did not warrant a 24% drop in house prices in a year. Through short term desires by savers to 
get out of assets and into cash -liquidation pricing- the real estate and the share markets got their pricing for  
these asset classes wrong. The long term price -the going concern price- based on net present values of future  
incomes and the short term prices based on liquidation scenarios deviated: the savings paradox. Liquidation  
price  setting  is  harmful  for  all  participants  in  the  economic  process,  be  they workers,  employers  or  a  
government, but such pricing is especially harmful to economic growth and to savers as the price setting 
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leads to unjustified economic  contractions in bank lending, in house building and in company investments.  
It also leads to wrong assessments about the adequacy of pension reserves. In the still operating DB schemes,  
or in the non-funded government employee schemes, it means that companies or the taxpayers have to pick 
up the tab for additional money injections, taking money away from investments or from funding normal  
government expenditure.
If  the  U.S.  government  would have  had  a  Secretary of  Savings  in  2006 or  2007,  the  Secretary would  
certainly have known about doubtful lending practises and would have placed such risks to long term savers 
squarely on the heads of  the  mortgage  originators  and mortgage  sellers,  like  the  investment  banks.  By 
instructing them to provide credit guarantees for their products, their absorption capacity would soon have 
run out and the subsequent losses would have stayed with them rather than having been transferred to savers  
worldwide. The losses would also have been much reduced. The crisis would have been less severe.
3. Managing Financial, Economic and Fiscal Risks
3.1 Key points
The flaws in the U.S. subprime mortgage lending debacle could not have been cured by legislation. The  
flaws were in the type of risk taking and in the transfer process from risk originators to long term savers. The  
direct link between fund providers and fund users was broken by packaging the risks. Companies, generally  
speaking, cannot or will not transfer their production risks to others as they own the know-how on which 
these production processes are based. In the financial markets risk transfers have reached very high levels,  
much of it is based on speculation. Because the “product” involved deals in money savings, authorities have 
been more hesitant in managing the risks.
The risks in the Spanish housing market crises, where 800 000 dwellings were built for which there are no  
buyers, stayed with the banks involved and these banks need to be saved. If these banks were allowed to go  
under, savers would be punished for actions by bank managements over which they had no influence or  
control.  If current plans for foreign funding for Spanish bank rescues get under way,  either the Spanish  
taxpayers or the foreign taxpayers become the ultimate risk takers. Spanish bank rescues do not solve the  
overhang of 800 000 unoccupied dwellings in Spain. In Section 3.2 an alternative solution is provided.
Given the size of private accumulated savings as compared to GDP and the damage to wealth and economies  
which  can  be  brought  about  by  a  lack  of  collective  risk  management,  it  is  somewhat  surprising  that 
governments have not seen it fit to appoint a Minister for Savings. His/her job should be to anticipate and  
manage risks occurring from actions affecting real estate prices, share prices and government bond yields.  
Managing  risks  means  an  active  form of  management.  Law making  is  a  very  small  component  of  it. 
Analyzing and acting upon short term financial and economic threats to savings are the keys in helping to get 
the balance right between savers actions in the short term and savers interests in the long term.. Currently  
helping economies to return to a “going concern” mode is needed. In the next few sections suggestions are  
made which may help to do this.
3.2 The case of Spain
In Spain, the cause of its current crisis has very little to do with the Euro as a currency or with the Spanish  
government acting imprudently, but all to do with some banks turning savings into 800 000 homes which 
could not be sold to potential buyers. What other European governments might have done to help manage  
these collective risks from spreading to the Spanish economy and Spanish government is setting up a second 
home  acquisition  scheme  for  their  own  nationals  rather  than  to  lend  Euro  100  billion  to  the  Spanish 
government, or directly to the Spanish banks. The latter injection equates to Euro 125 000 for each unsold 
home. The unsold home problem could have been solved much more effectively by supporting foreigners in  
buying homes in Spain from the Spanish banks or population. This could be done with the help of a subsidy.  
Instead of providing Euro 125 000 per home, give foreigners a subsidy of 20% of the amount i.e. Euro 25000 
per  home.  If  the  lending  is  also  executed  by  German,  British,  French,  Dutch,  Swiss,  Austrian  and  
Scandinavian banks than the inward capital movement into Spain will help solve the real estate crisis, part of  
the banking crisis and a substantial part of the government debt crisis. The homes should be of a minimal 
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value of Euro 150 000, which equates to properties of 120 sq meters in the Spanish Mediterranean Coastal  
provinces. Such potential buyers should themselves put in an amount minimally equal to the governments’  
injection. The remainder amount should be up to the foreign bank’s credit judgment. The buyers should also  
agree not to sell the properties for a minimum of five years.  The Bank of Spain could supervise the scheme.  
Of course the scheme would be stopped as and when the supply of homes comes nearer to the full utilisation  
levels.
The consequences: The Spanish property markets will turn around pretty quickly; a place in the sun is still a 
dream for many Northern Europeans. The Spanish banks will be relieved from their property overhang on  
which no cash flow is received while their borrowings still carry interest costs. The Spanish people who sell  
and move to other properties will usually have more cash available as 50% of homes are owned in Spain 
without a mortgage. European governments usually operate either capital gains taxes or income taxes on  
second properties, so they will get their money back in due course. Last but not least the capital inflows into  
Spain and the strengthening of the banking sector plus the additional tourist incomes will help the Spanish 
economy to turn around as well. This comes all at a fraction of the costs of the Euro 100 billion. Spanish  
government  bond  yields  will  come  down  as  well.  The  example  is  just  one  of  the  ways  in  which 
understanding the causes of the risks to savers can help devise sound solutions. The “perceived risk” outlook  
for Spain will fundamentally change by implementing this scheme.
3.3 The choice of government bond yields
Just  like  real  estate  markets  and  share  markets,  government  bond  markets  also  suffer  from  over-  or  
undershooting. In the government bond markets, the short term movements of savers to take their savings to 
“safe” havens in times of extreme economic and financial uncertainties, is not based on yields, but on the  
principle of trying to preserve the principal amount of savings notwithstanding the yield.  In the case of  
government debt, the future cash flows needed to service the debts are based on transfers from the taxpayers  
to the government. The ability to do so depends on full employment and economic growth. Contrary to  
savings used for real  estate  and shares  purchasing,  which help create  growth,  government  debt  funding  
represents mainly funding past government expenditure: a type of consumer debt obligation. As there is no 
future cash flow other than an income transfer from the private sector to a government, there is also no  
natural long term price for such debts. This means that governments need to set such a price. It is therefore 
surprising  that  no  parliamentary  discussions  have  been  taking  place  about  achieving  the  right  balance 
between savers’ and taxpayers interests in setting the long term bond yield.
Three points need to be made in this respect: the first one is that short term savers’ actions to move savings  
to “safe havens” can distort the long term bond yields. Secondly on top of this, governments themselves can 
further  distort  long term bond yields  by printing money by their  central  banks and buy up outstanding 
government bonds. The Weimar Republic example of using the government money printing press to fund 
past government expenditure should be a clear warning to all governments. Monetary and fiscal prudence is  
a virtue. Thirdly and last but not least a government is the only entity which can set its own yield for 10 year 
bonds as well as maintain the yield by buying and selling operations by its central bank. Such stability in 
long term yields  helps all  other entities planning their  future cash flows.  This helps pension funds,  life  
insurance companies, but also the banking sector.
 
A stable 10 year government bond yield for any government could be set at inflation level plus 2%. 
The  unique  situation  for  government  bond yields  of  the  17  Eurozone  countries,  which  share  the  same 
currency but have different tax levels and various other economic criteria, is discussed in the next section.
In Annex 1 the current U.K. pension situation is described.
3.4 The Eurozone choice for government bond stability
The 17 Eurozone countries share one currency, but each country has a different inflation rate, a different rate  
of economic growth, a different level of unemployment, a different level of outstanding government debt and 
a  different  state  of  its  banking  sectors.  Managing  the  gap  risks  between  short  and  long  term savings  
intentions needs positive government actions.
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This could be done as follows: Countries such as Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,  
France and Finland could attract 10 year funds from the financial markets not for government spending but  
for financial risk management purposes by depositing these funds as reserves at the ECB.  As an example,  
Germany could use these powers till its borrowing yield would reach 3.9%, 2% over its current inflation  
level. These savings remain German savings at the ECB. For the other six funding countries their inflation 
rate plus 2% would also be the yard stick. The ECB could with these funds, subsequently buy up government 
debt of the 10 countries, provided that they follow the fiscal pact. In these 10 countries the yield has overshot  
the level of inflation plus 2%. In the case of Spain, which always had a very prudent central government, its  
inflation rate is, like Germany’s, 1.9%, but its yield is 7%. In this example the ECB would buy 10 year  
Spanish bonds currently at 7% and subsequently at lower yields till the Spanish yield also stands at 3.9%. 
The ECB’s interest income from Spanish bonds exceeds the borrowing costs of the seven countries. Such 
interest income will be fully distributed over the funders pro rata of their funding contributions. In this way  
the  costs  of  issuing  more  government  debt  than  needed for  own government  expenditure  of  the  seven 
countries is more than met by the income from bonds of the 10 countries held by the ECB. For the taxpayers  
in the seven countries, they have no future tax obligations based on the additional borrowing levels as such 
borrowings are deposited with ECB. The seven countries can issue more debt, but the funds are not used for 
domestic expenditure. Fiscal prudence stays intact. The action is aimed at maintaining financial stability  
across the Eurozone, rather than increasing government expenditure levels in any participating Eurozone  
country. The interest costs will be met by the real borrowers, the 10 nations. The fund suppliers –the seven  
nations- get an extra income, while the taxpayers in the 10 countries benefit from the balancing act of the 
ECB. The ECB does not need to rely on money printing, but can rely on moving real private savings within 
the Eurozone countries. The risks involved are minimal as the 10 countries can fund their government bond  
obligations, not on wrongly “perceived risks” but on actual realised risks. By lowering the overall risk level  
in the Eurozone countries all countries benefit. Of course, the criterion for assisting the 10 countries is that  
they apply the fiscal pact requirements. Executing such a balancing act has to be done on a daily basis; only 
the ECB is up to this task. The European Financial Stability Fund cannot operate in the required manner. The 
financial markets will relish this type of market stabilisation by the ECB and private sector fund flows will  
soon return directly to the higher paying Eurozone countries, making intervention unnecessary.
3.5 How to stimulate economic growth
3.5.1 The pension fund variety
The traditional manner to stimulate economic growth was the Keynesian method of using private savings to  
fund government deficit spending in the current year.  The traditional manner has most  likely reached its 
limitations for the U.K. and other countries as government debt levels have reached from 80 to over 100% of  
GDP levels. Another way in which such economic stimulus can be executed is to allow all pension funds and 
life insurance companies to collectively inject 2% of, for instance, Britain’s GDP, equalling £31 billion into 
the U.K. household sector this year.  This amount is less than 2% of the assets held by these funds and  
companies. In order not to disturb financial markets, the Bank of England could advance these funds to the  
pension funds and life companies till new cash inflows from pension contributions, dividends and interest  
flows make up for this amount. Pension funds etc. could distribute such funds –preferably tax free- on an 
equal amount basis to all pension savers and retirees drawing a pension already- equal to reflect that new  
savers will have to contribute for a very long time until receiving benefits-.  The recipients need to get the 
message  from the U.K.  government  that  it  is  vital  to  the  economic  health  of  the  country to  spend the  
additional income rather than save it. If done, the £ 31 billion will set off the demand pull injection which in  
the past was funded via the government’s deficit creation. Once these savings injections have raised growth 
rates to, say, 2% per annum, government tax revenues will have increased and out such tax revenues the  
pension funds etc. could gradually be repaid for their loss of reserves. The costs to taxpayers could be set at  
CPI  plus  2% over  the  period  that  the  funds  were  used  for  creating  the  economic  stimulus.  The  U.K. 
Government  debt  levels  will  not  increase;  real  savings  will  be  converted  into  consumption  when  the  
economy needs it and the taxpayers will return these savings when economic growth levels have reached the 
desired level. All sectors of the U.K. economy benefit. It will lead to lower unemployment levels, to higher 
company outputs and profits, to lower risks for the banking sector and to higher government revenues levels.  
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It will also lead to improved share prices based on higher company profits. The “pension dividend” method  
represents a different way of managing collective economic risks. The method could be applied not just in  
the U.K., but also in The Netherlands, as in the U.S. and in Canada as well. The latter countries all have large 
amounts of savings accumulated in funded private sector pensions. What is also encouraging is that the 
pension dividend method can be started up and stopped much more easily than governments can control their 
extra spending once Keynesian programmes have been formulated and started up.
3.5.2 The transfer of savings variety
In order to get the economies in the 10 Eurozone countries growing again, some may need some help. The 
European Financial  Stability  Fund may need to  set  up  for  these  countries,  which  lack  sizeable  funded 
pension savings, a similar scheme as the pension dividend injection scheme of the U.K.  Such facility is an  
economic loan to foreign taxpayers, to be repaid as and when economic growth rates have reached their  
targets. Such economic loans should only carry the taxpayers’ guarantees, but not the governments’ ones.  
For  Spain one could think of  about  2% of  GDP or  Euro 35 billion,  to  be handed out,  tax free,  to  all  
households  on an equal  basis,  perhaps in  semi  annual  instalments.  This  injection –an economic  easing 
scheme- might need to be repeated in 2013. Repayments should start when economic growth rates have  
reached their desired levels. Again governments need to get the message across that spending the received 
monies  is  needed  to  get  employment  levels  up  as  well  as  economic  growth  in  the  self  interest  of  all 
concerned. By helping one Eurozone country back to growth and prosperity, it will help all others.
4. Conclusions
The conversion of savings into real estate, government bonds and company shares creates long term time  
risks on cash flows and values. Individual savers, in order to protect the principal value of their savings, may  
move away from some assets in the short run. This harms all savers: The savings paradox. Economies go 
from  a  going  concern  mode  into  a  liquidation  mode.  Such  collective  risks  can  only  be  managed  by 
governments  by  devising  appropriate  risk  management  strategies,  like  a  home  buying  programme  for 
foreigners buying up the overhang of Spanish properties, like a 10 year bond yield management programme,  
a pension dividend scheme and an economic easing programme to strengthen economic growth rates. Once 
private financial markets conclude that risks are well managed, the other risks, such as banking risks become  
automatically more manageable. Fiscal austerity and economic growth policies can go hand in hand as long 
as savers feel that their interests are properly looked after and rewarded. DB schemes will become less costly  
for companies to maintain and funded pension funds will become much more popular as their yields will  
increase.  Over  time,  the  losses  on  savings  will  be  reduced  and  economic  efficiency  enhanced.  Even 
accountants and actuaries can sleep better.
Drs Kees de Koning
21th July 2012
E-mail: keesdekoning008@hotmail.com
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Annex 1. The case of the U.K.
According to the Pension Protection Fund, in the month of May 2012,  the 6432 remaining final salary 
private sector funds saw their collective deficit grow with UK£ 95 billion or 50% over the previous month.  
Over the last year till May the total deficit is now 13 times higher than 12 months ago at £ 312 billion.  Total 
assets were £1031 billion and total liabilities £ 1343 billion. 5503 schemes were in deficit and 929 in surplus. 
On top of the £ 1 trillion in DB schemes, the UK has another £900 billion in DC schemes saved up as per  
end 2011 according to TheCityUK.
One has to add another savings element to these totals.  It is common in the U.K. to buy an annuity from life  
insurance  companies  on  or  near  the  date  of  retirement.  The  life  insurance  companies  in  the  U.K.  are  
responsible for another £ 1.7 trillion in invested savings assets.
The efforts and government decisions to postpone the retirement age and to widen the level of contributors to  
pension schemes help in the very long run but do not take away the miserable investment results over the  
past  13 years.  This was highlighted in  the  OECD Pension Outlook 2012.  For  future  years,  the outlook  
remains poor, unless the U.K economy gets a boost and unless the Bank of England changes its policy 
towards the long term yield curve of U.K. government bonds. 
For the U.K. the key element for pension funds, but also for life insurance companies and banks is the  
negative real return on government bonds and indirectly the negative returns on shares as the economy is 
stalling. One cannot hope for economic growth or for a decent pension if long term savings are not rewarded 
with positive real interest rates. For U.K. banks, their costs of funds exceed the returns on 10 year U.K. 
government bonds, so holding these government bonds -supposed to be the safest asset- is a loss making 
operation, undermining the whole equity structure of U.K. banks. For life insurance companies it means  
lowering the value of the annuity pay out for people who have saved all their working life for a pension. For  
the savers it means that saving is not profitable, so they stop saving, while all economic agents need such  
savings.
All pension savers are taxpayers, but not all taxpayers save for a pension. The current yield of 1.78% on 10  
year  bonds compares with the long term average yield of 6.1%.  The current  yield has been artificially 
doctored by the Bank of England (the Bank) by buying up £ 325 billion (plus another £ 50 billion in the  
pipeline) out of about £1trillion of U.K. government debt. The undershoot has occurred as a consequence of  
the Bank using an instrument –quantitative easing- which lowers long term yields on gilts- for short term  
purposes. In this case it was not that the financial markets got their pricing wrong, but government action by  
the Bank that brought down the yield. Managing the gap between the short and long term actions by savers  
requires market intervention by the Bank in the gilts markets. It is a contradiction in terms in using the long 
term gilts markets for supplying short term liquidity to the banking sector. Funding for lending programmes  
can do the same job without any interference in the gilts markets. 
A quantitative easing programme puts an unequal –some might go as far as say unfair- competition element  
in the private savings markets. The Bank can create money at 0% interest rate costs. Banks need to reward  
their savers and so do pension funds. They need a positive yield over their costs of funds. Hence they cannot  
compete with the Bank.
What should be such yield? The long term average yield has been 6.1%. In the last  three years,  which  
coincided with the Bank’s QE programme, the real return has turned strongly negative. In September 2009 
the positive spread of yield over inflation was still 2.15%; from January to June 2010 this difference had 
dropped to 0.1%; in the second half of 2010 the yield difference became a negative 0.6%; for the first half of  
2011 it went to a further negative 0.95%; in the second half of 2011 it went down to minus 2.2% and it 
stayed negative to the tune of minus 1.5% over the first five months of 2012.
There has been no period since 1990 that the 10 year yield on U.K. gilts was not a positive 2% or more over  
U.K. inflation rate in the same period, apart from the period since September 2009.
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Managing financial risks is not done by creating inflation and is also not done by discouraging private sector 
savings. It  is also not done by forcing companies to pay additional amounts into DB funds, which take 
money away for investment purposes. Managing financial risks is done through balanced budget policies. 
The  U.K.  government  needs  private  savings  to  fund  its  past  debt  and  current  deficit  coverage.  U.K.  
companies need those savings and so do the property markets. Banks need the positive income from gilts to  
manage their credit risks better. Creating stability in the long term U.K. government gilt market should be a  
normal part of the Bank’s operations.  The logical target is around 2% over the inflation level, the latter  
currently at 2.4%, so the ten year gilt yield should be around 4.4%.  The U.K. economy is seen as a safe 
haven economy. In these circumstances to gradually jack up yields to 4.4% should not be difficult in any 
way, local and foreign savers will jump at the opportunity. Buying and selling operations can help stabilise  
the gilt markets, but under- or overshooting is detrimental to the overall economy and to any saver in the  
country. It is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of short and long term savers’ actions. 
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